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THE FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE HOLY SEE AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL:
A SYMPOSIUM
AN INTRODUCTION
MarshallJ. Breger*
The Vatican-Israel Accord of 1993 was clearly a political documentone undertaken between two sovereign states.1 At the same time, there
can be no doubt that the Accord would not have been possible without
significant change in the traditional theological approach of the Catholic
Church towards the people of Israel. Any student of modem Christianity will understand immediately the extraordinary changes that have
taken place in recent Vatican thinking toward Judaism and the Jewish
people. The Catholic Church has made a 180-degree turn in its view of
Jews and Judaism since the 1965 Vatican Declaration Nostra Aetate.2
Moving beyond what Jules Isaac termed "the teaching of contempt,"'
Catholics now claim that "the Jews still remain most dear to God., 4 In a
1985 statement, the Vatican told us that "Judaism is a living religion" and
that the Hebrew Bible "retains its own value as revelation."5
* Visiting Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School
of Law. B.A. 1967, University of Pennsylvania; B. Phil (Oxon.) 1970, Oxford University;
J.D. 1973, University of Pennsylvania.
1. The question of whether the Vatican should be treated as a sovereign state has
been fully reviewed by scholars. The references are well arrayed in Yasmin Abdullah,
Note, The Holy See at United Nations Conferences: State or Church?, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
1835, 1835 n.3 (1996).
2. The Second Vatican Council, Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to
Non-Christian Religions, Nostra Aetate, no. 4,Oct. 28, 1965 [hereinafter Declaration], reprinted in EUGENE J. FISHER, FAITH WITHOUT PREJUDICE: REBUILDING CHRISTIAN
ATTITUDES TOWARD JUDAISM 131 (1993).
3.

JULES ISAAC, THE TEACHING OF CONTEMPT: CHRISTIAN ROOTS OF ANTI-

SEMITISM 17 (Helen Weaver trans., Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1964) (1962).
4. Declaration, supranote 2, at 132.
5. Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews, Guidelines and Suggestions
for Implementing the Conciliar Declaration, Nostra Aetate, no. 4, Dec. 1, 1974, reprintedin
FISHER, supra note 2, at 133, 134. These themes were further explicated in the Commission's 1985 statement, NOTES ON THE CORRECT WAY TO PRESENT THE JEWS AND
JUDIASM IN ROMAN CATHOLIC PREACHING AND CATECHESIS (Vatican City, June 24,
1985).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 47:369

I. THE VATICAN AND ISRAEL

The Vatican view toward a Jewish state in Palestine has evolved together with its position toward Judaism.6 In January 1904, Theodore
Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, met with Pope Pius X to ask for
his support for the Zionist enterprise.7 The Pope's response was swift
and certain:
We are unable to favor this movement. We cannot prevent the
Jews from going to Jerusalem-but we could never sanction it.
The ground of Jerusalem, if it were not always sacred, has been
sanctified by the life of Jesus Christ. As the head of the Church
I cannot answer you otherwise. The Jews have not recognized
our Lord, therefore we cannot recognize the Jewish people.8
With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the entry of the British
Army, under Lord Edmund Allenby, into Jerusalem, the Holy See
sought a seat at the table deciding Jerusalem's fate. Their goal was to ensure control of Palestine by a Western power-preferably Catholic.
Thus, after the First World War, the Vatican sought to have Italy or another Catholic state take the Palestine Mandate.9 Failing in such efforts
the Vatican sought to keep the Mandate in "Christian" hands. '
Notwithstanding the Vatican's efforts "to stir up opposition"'" to Britain-a Protestant country-taking on the Mandate, the League of Na6. The literature on the Vatican-Israel relationship is limited yet growing. See Silvio
Ferrari, The Vatican, Israel and the Jerusalem Question (1943-1984), 39 MIDDLE EAST J.
316, 316-31 (1985); see also GEORGE EMILE IRANI, THE PAPACY AND THE MIDDLE
EAST: THE ROLE OF THE HOLY SEE IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1962-1984, at 1330 (1986); ANDREJ KREUTZ, VATICAN POLICY ON THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI
CONFLICT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HOLY LAND 93-94 (1990). See generally SERGIO I.
MINERBI, THE VATICAN AND ZIONISM: CONFLICT IN THE HOLY LAND, 1895-1925
(Arnold Schwarz trans., 1990); LIVIA ROKACH, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE

QUESTION OF PALESTINE (1987).
7. See THE DIARIES OF THEODOR HERZL 427 (Marvin Lowenthal ed. & trans.,
1956).
8. Id. at 428. Earlier, Herzl met with the Vatican Secretary of State, Cardinal Merry
del Val, who informed him that "in order that we should come out for the Jewish people in
the way you desire, they would first have to accept conversion." Id. at 421; see also ALEX
BEIN, THEODORE HERZL: A BIOGRAPHY 490 (Maurice Samuel trans., 1941).
9. See Silvio Ferrari & Francesco Margiotta Broglio, The Vatican, the European
Community, and the Status of Jerusalem, in 3 STUDI IN MEMORIA

DI MARIO

CONDORELLI 571, 573-74 (Dott. A. Giuffr6 ed., 1988).
10. This desire was not mitigated by the tragedy of World War II. By this time,
"[s]uch a solution it well knew, however, was unattainable, and in the actual circumstances
it preferred the Arabs to the Jews." Id. at 574 (citing the comments of John Victor
Perowne, British Plenipotentiary Minister to the Holy See, in the summer of 1949).
11. See KREUTZ, supra note 6, at 42 & nn.81-82 (attributing the phrase to Lord Arthur James Balfour, British Foreign Secretary).
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tions awarded the Palestine Mandate to Britain in 1922." During World
War I, Britain had promulgated the Balfour Declaration. At that time, it
"view[ed] with favour" the development of a Jewish national home in
Palestine.13 The reality of British governance was quite different during
the Mandate period as it sought to navigate between its Balfour Declaration commitments and the interests of the local Arab population. The
next twenty-five years of British rule saw continuous Jewish immigration
met by continuous Arab resistance. At the end of World War II, the intensity of Jewish commitment to Palestine grew and a war-weary Britain
chose to "break camp" as part of its more general imperial retreat.
In November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted in favor of partitioning Palestine into independent Arab and Jewish states after much hard lobbying by Zionists, who favored partition, and Arab
leaders, who opposed it. 14 The Jerusalem-Bethlehem area (with a corridor to the Mediterranean Sea) was designated a corpus separatum to be
administered by the United Nations itself. 5 Events on the ground, however, swiftly overwhelmed diplomacy. The United Nations partition recommendation was not acted upon because of the outbreak of war in May
1948 between the newly declared State of Israel and five surrounding
Arab nations.

12. See MINERBI, supra note 6, at 178-95 (describing in detail the Vatican's objection
and opposition to the Mandate).
13. See The Balfour Declaration (Nov. 2, 1917), reprinted in THE ARAB-ISRAEL
CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION:

SELECTED DOCUMENTS, at 20 (Ruth Lapidoth &

Moshe Hirsch eds., 1992) [hereinafter ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT DOCUMENTS].
14. See G.A. Res. 181(11), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 1947, at 146-50, U.N. Doc. A/64
(1947), reprinted in THE JERUSALEM QUESTION AND ITS RESOLUTION:

SELECTED

DOCUMENTS, at 6-10 (Ruth Lapidoth & Moshe Hirsch eds., 1994).
15. See id. at 131. This tracked the views of the 1937 Royal (Peel) Commission Report which called for the partition of Palestine to allow for the creation of independent
Arab and Jewish states. See PALESTINE ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, 1937, Cmd. 5479,
at 382-83; see also PALESTINE STATEMENT OF POLICY BY His MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1937, Cmd. 5513. Concerning Jerusalem and its holy places,
the report stated: "The partition of Palestine is subject to the overriding necessity of
keeping the sanctity of Jerusalem and Bethlehem inviolate and of ensuring free and safe
access to them for all the world." PALESTINE ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra, at
381. Safeguarding the holy places was considered, in the words of the Mandate, "a sacred
trust of civili[z]ation." LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 1, reprinted in
ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT DOCUMENTS, supra note 13, at 23-24. Accordingly, the members of the Royal Commission proposed that Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth, and the
Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) be made a corpus separatum, and thus be detached from
the proposed Arab and Jewish states. With a designated road access to the sea, the Christian Holy Areas would have the status of a separate enclave under international administration. See PALESTINE ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra, at 381-84, and accompanying Map No. 8.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 47:369

Both at the time of the 1947 partition plan and afterwards, the Vatican
supported the internationalization of the city of Jerusalem. 6 After the
Six Day War, however, the Vatican policy on Jerusalem began to move
away from its insistence on the creation of a separate legal jurisdiction or
corpus separatum to accept the notion of international guarantees to
safeguard the uniqueness of the city. 17 At this time, the internationalization option is simply not on the political agenda of any of the
"stakeholders" in the Jerusalem dispute.
II. THE VATICAN-ISRAEL ACCORD AND THE LAW REVIEW SYMPOSIUM

In December 1993, the Vatican signed an Accord with Israel that led
to recognition and the exchange of Ambassadors." The bilateral agreement dealt with a variety of political issues including taxation of churches
and pilgrimage rights. The agreement committed both parties to promote religious freedom and ensure access to the holy places. As the Accord stated, "[t]he State of Israel affirms its continuing commitment to
maintain and respect the 'Status quo' in the Christian Holy Places to
which it applies and the respective rights of the Christian communities
thereunder.""
The 1993 Accord called for the creation of a number of working
groups to produce follow up in areas such as the taxation and the legal
personality of the Catholic Church during a three year period. Consistent with the Vatican's new approach toward the Jewish people, the
Agreement also stated that "[tihe Holy See and the State of Israel are
committed to appropriate cooperation in combating all forms of antisemitism.'20
The Church expected the 1993 Accord to begin a new day in VaticanIsrael relations. During the period of 1993 to 1997, the hopes that the
Fundamental Agreement would lead to a flowering of Vatican-Israeli
relations were never consummated. Working group meetings on outstanding issues began auspiciously on July 4, 1994. Despite this initial ef16. See Ferrari & Broglio, supra note 9, at 579-80. For a useful presentment of the
past Vatican discussion on Jerusalem (internationalization of the whole city) and present
position ("special status" and "international guarantees") see generally Silvio Ferrari, The
Religious Significance of Jerusalem in the Middle East Peace Process:Some Legal Implica-

tions, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 733 (1996); Silvio Ferrari, The Struggle for Jerusalem, 11 EUR.
J. INT'L AFF. 22-39 (1991); Ferrari, supra note 6, at 316-31.
17. See Ferrari & Broglio, supra note 9, at 583.
18. See Fundamental Agreement Between the Holy See and the State of Israel, Dec.
30, 1993, Vatican-Isr., 33 I.L.M. 153 (1994) [hereinafter Fundamental Agreement].
19. Id. art. 4, para. 1, at 155.
20. Id. art. 2, para. 1, at 155.
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fort, nothing was done to undertake the joint activity on antisemitism,
and the taxation working group meetings petered out by early 1996.
Most important, the agreement on legal personality, which had been assiduously negotiated by technical working groups throughout 1994 and
1995 and initialed by representatives of the negotiating team in May
1996, seemed to hit a deep freeze.
At first, delay was understandable. The election that May of Benjamin
Netanyahu as Prime Minister was naturally going to create an interregnum until a new foreign policy team took over. The delay, however, had
more deep-seated roots. Unlike the Peres government, which had an interest in matters European, the Netanyahu government expressed little
interest in the Vatican "file." Indeed, Netanyahu visited Italy in February 1997 to meet with the Pope at the Vatican, and he conferred afterward with Cardinal Sodano, the Vatican Secretary of State and was
asked by Vatican Foreign Minister Jean-Louis Tauran about the agreement. He was then asked by Tauran about the legal personality agreement and, to the Vatican's dismay, responded that this was the first he
had heard of it. It took a symposium at The Catholic University of
America's Columbus School of Law and a meeting called by William
Cardinal Keeler with American Jewish leaders to spur the Israeli government forward.'
One technical reason for the delay was the need for positive legislation
by the Israeli Knesset to implement the legal personality agreement.
This required significant analysis by the Attorney-General and the
drafting of implementing legislation by his staff. At the same time, however, there was concern at the political level that an agreement with the
Catholic Church might, in some way, offend the orthodox religious elements in Netanyahu's jostling governing coalition. The Foreign Minister,
to some extent, was left to rely on the approval of the Attorney General,
a highly respected orthodox former jurist, not only for legal sufficiency,
but for religious propriety as well.

21. The symposium, which took place April 8-9, 1997, was entitled "Continuing the
Dialogue: The Fundamental Agreement Between the Holy See and the State of Israel: A
Third Anniversary Perspective," and was co-sponsored with the Embassy of Israel. Professor William Wagner of the Columbus School of Law and I organized the symposium.
The success of the conference was due, in large measure, to Professor Wagner's creative
spirit and deep spiritual commitment.
At the conference, Israel's ambassador to the United States, Eliahu Ben-Elissar, announced that "[t]he legal agreement, already initialed by the two sides, will be brought
before the government for ratification in the very, very near future." Larry Witham,
Catholic Church Frustrated with Israel: Diplomacy Stalled Despite Recognition, WASH.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 1997, at A12.
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The delay in signing the legal personality agreement was extremely
frustrating for the Holy See. As one Vatican diplomat noted at the Columbus School of Law conference, it is necessary to bring "an awareness
of the need to go forward with what the journey demands, otherwise
there is the risk
that everything that has already been done will be ren22
dered void.
From the Vatican perspective, recognition of the Church as a legal entity was very important. For approximately 500 years, the Church maintained an undefined legal status under the Ottoman Empire, the British
Mandate, and Israeli rule. The Church and its institutions in Israel were
recognized de facto under the Ottoman "status quo" agreements. Now,
the Vatican had given away in the 1993 Accord what it deemed to be its
own best bargaining chip-recognition of the state of Israel. Some in the
Roman Curia, who had urged caution in opening relations with Israel,
were now suggesting "I told you so." The Church felt strongly the need
to institutionalize its legal status.
The agreement on the legal personality of the Catholic Church was approved by the Israeli cabinet on September 7, 1997 and signed by Israeli
Foreign Minister David Levy and the Apostolic Nuncio Archbishop
Montezemolo in Jerusalem on November 10, 1997.23 The purpose of the
agreement was to normalize the status and legal personality of the
Catholic Church and its institutions. The agreement determined that the
Catholic Church and many of its institutions would be accorded legal
status (such as association or corporate status) under Israeli law. The institutions also would be included in an official state registry (such as the
Registrar of Associations or the Registrar of Religious Trusts), and their
interaction with non-Church bodies in Israeli would be subject to Israeli
law, including litigation in Israeli law courts.
On the other hand, Church institutions would maintain full internal
autonomy in the administration of its institutions and assets in Israel.
Adjudication of these matters would be left to the Church in accordance
with Canon Law. Thus, Israel committed itself "not only to the de jure
confirmation of those rights pertaining to the Catholic Church's educational and philanthropic institutions, but also to enshrine the authorita-

22. Id. (quoting the remarks of Archbishop Claudio Maria Celli).
23. See Legal PersonalityAgreement with the Holy See (Dep't of Comm. & Pub. Aff.,
Consulate General of Israel, New York, N.Y.), Nov. 11, 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Legal Personality Agreement]. As of April 15, 1998, the exchange of the instruments of ratification
had not yet taken place.
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tive structure of the Catholic Church's hierarchy and religious orders in
Israeli law."24
The agreement also consists of directives, principles for implementation, and appendices. The appendices include the list of Church institutions that have been recognized as legal personalities and are to be included in the state registry. Names of institutions may be added or
removed from the list in the future.
It is important to note that the agreement concerns areas where Israeli
legislation is in effect-a formula which includes East Jerusalem. 5 This
has resulted in the Palestinian calling the agreement "a stab in the
back. 2 6 In early December 1997, the Palestinian legislature sent an "urgent message" to the Islamic summit in Teheran calling on Yasser Arafat
to send a delegation27 to "inform the Pope of the dangerous consequences
of this agreement.
Notwithstanding this progress in Vatican-Israel relations, an agreement regarding tax exempt status between the two parties still remains to
be negotiated. Such an agreement, once it materializes, would revolve
around the tax privileges of clergy and tax exemption for religious property. The agreement could be drawn from a 1948 understanding Israel
28
reached with France, as then interlocutor for the Catholic community.
III. FUTURE ISSUES

Despite the progress that has been made in Vatican-Israel relations,
significant issues remain. The following are some of the most pressing
issues.

24. David Rosen, New Agreement Between Vatican and Israel Yet Another Step on the
Journey of Reconciliation, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at 14, available in 1997 WL

12035986.
25. See Legal PersonalityAgreement, supra note 23, at 1.
26. PalestiniansCall Vatican-Israeli Accord a "Stab in the Back," AGENCE FRANCEPRESSE, Nov. 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13431992.
27. PalestiniansAsk Islamic Summit to Counter Vatican-Israel Agreement, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13450716.
28. A 1948 exchange of letters between the representative of the Jewish Agency in
Paris and the Director-General of the French Foreign Ministry led to a continuing dispute
as to whether the exchange constituted an agreement by Israel to continue the privileges
and exemptions for French Catholic institutions as enumerated in the Ottoman status quo.
Israeli authorities viewed the exchange as an agreement to conduct negotiations as to
whether the historical arrangements were to continue to have effect. See Eitan Margalit,
Comments on the Fundamental Agreement Between the Holy See and the State of Israel,
JUSTICE, June 1994, at 24, 25.
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A. ChristiansLiving in the Holy Land
Christians face three practical problems which affect their relations
with Israel. First, they are fractured and each group is concerned that
another church might secure advantages that it does not have. Thus,
they insist on the Ottoman "status quo" at all times even if doing so
might hurt their individual interests. For example, the different denominations who claim possessory interests in the Church of the Holy Sepulcher jealously guard every inch of "title" and every presumption of customary privilege that they can. For example, the Copts, an Egyptian
Christian Church, and the Ethiopian Christians have disputed for centuries over the monastery of Deir al Sultan east of the Church of the Holy
Sepulcher. The Copts were in possession until 1970, when on Easter
night the Ethiopians entered and changed the locks while the Copts were
at Church. In protest, the Copts camped out for years in an encampment
of "huts" by their old home. Efforts to remedy this reversal of fortune
remain mired in the Israeli legal process.29
Even today, the Christian communities remain at odds over control of
Christian holy places. It has taken more than thirty years to create a consensus among the different denominations present at the Church of the
Holy Sepulcher as to how to proceed with vital building repairs." A consensus was only reached after Israeli officials, fearing a cave in, threatened to make the repairs to the ceiling themselves. A dispute over the
painting of the dome of the rotunda took more than twelve years to resolve."
29. In The Coptic Patriarchatev. The Minister of Police (1971), 25(1), P.D., 225, the
Copts secured an order of eviction. Enforcement was postponed to allow the government
to make determinations as to substantive rights under the 1924 Order in Council. See Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council, in LIONEL G.A. CUST, THE STATUS QUO IN THE
HOLY PLACES OF CHRISTENDOM 65 (1971). The committee has met once since 1971, but
a second petition in 1977 based on grounds that the court was waiting for the government
to act failed. See The Coptic Patriarchatev. The Government of Israel (1979), 33(1), P.D.,
225. At different times, both the Egyptian and the Ethiopian governments have intervened on behalf of their "charges." See generally Walter Zander, Jurisdictionand Holiness: Reflections on the Coptic-EthiopianCase, 17 ISRAEL L. REV. 245 (1982).
30. See Lisa Pevtzow, Holy Squabbles, JERUSALEM POST MAG., Apr. 1, 1994, at 6
(describing the territorial battles among the six religious denominations housed in the
Church).
31. See Mary Curtius, Holy Sepulcher Church PaintJob an Act of Faiths, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 1995, at Al; see also Michael Krikorian, A Simple Cross Ends Decades of Division, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1995, at B4. A Roman Catholic investment banker from Rye,
New York, George Doty, who provided the funding, "stressed that all the work had taken
place within the framework of the status quo." Haim Shapiro, Holy Sepulcher Cupola
Unveiled After 68 Years Under Wraps, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 3, 1997, at 20. Only after
seeking the assistance of the Pontifical Mission for Palestine, a social services organization,
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The Greek Orthodox have often indicated that maintenance of Israeli
control of Christian holy places was preferable to revision of the Ottoman status quo. 32 The Greek Orthodox fear that, in any revision, they
would lose out to the larger and more powerful Roman Catholic
Church.33 In speaking of the holy places, Metropolitan Timothy, Secretary of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, underscored that
"[t]he Vatican does not represent us. ' "3 In late 1995, the Patriarch Diodorues I issued a call for a legally binding agreement with Israel that
would not compromise the existing status quo.35 Similar intramural tension might be expected among Muslim interests if they were to be
handed the Muslim Holy Places to "govern."
Second, most of the lay Christians in the Jerusalem area are Palestinians and do not wish, out of either solidarity or fear, to isolate themselves
from general Palestinian concerns. Many of the clergy, including the
senior clergy, are from European countries and have interests that are
not necessarily identical with the Palestinian laity.36
Third, there is a real concern with maintaining a sufficient Christian
community in Jerusalem to serve as "witness" to Christian needs and
concerns. This demographic problem may not be the fault of any specific
party, but it is real. Since 1948, the Christian community of Jerusalem
has dropped in size from 30,000 to between 10,000 and 12,000. Bethlehem, where Church tradition places Jesus' birth, no longer has a Christian majority.37 Reverend Peter Vasko, a Franciscan priest and leader of
Doty was able to secure the agreement of all the religious "stakeholders" to begin the restoration. See Graziano Motta, Jerusalem Basilica's Dome is Restored, L'OSSERVATORE
ROMANO, weekly ed., Feb. 8-19, 1997, at 8.
32. See Haim Shapiro, Greek Orthodox: Consult us on Status of Holy Places,
JERUSALEM POST,

July 20, 1994, at 1.

33. Thus, the Greek Orthodox Church, together with 11 other Church leaders, signed
a memorandum calling for the maintenance of the status quo in regards to Christian holy
places. See generally Memorandum, The Significance of Jerusalemfor Christians(Nov. 14,
1994) (on file with author). But note that the Catholic Church already adopted this position in its 1993 Accord with Israel. See Fundamental Agreement, supra note 18, art. 4,
para. 1, at 155.
34. Shapiro, supra note 32, at 1.
35. See Haim Shapiro, PatriarchWants Agreement Between Non-Catholic Church and
Israel, JERUSALEM PosT, Dec. 29, 1995, at 24.
36. One exception, of course, is the Latin Patriarchate, His Excellency, Michel Sabbah, the first Palestinian Christian to hold that office. See Michel Sabbah, The Church of
Jerusalem: Living with Conflict, Working for Peace, COMMONWEAL, Jan. 12, 1996, at 14
(presenting the views of Michel Sabbah).
37. It is unclear what, if anything, can be done to resolve this problem. It may be
necessary for the municipality to consider providing housing assistance for Christians in
the Old City, where most of them live in the same way that the government of Israel provides incentives for building new areas for Jewish settlement. While this may cause prob-
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the Holy Land Foundation, has suggested, "If we don't do something
now, within 60 to 70 years, there will be no Christian Churches
in the
38
Holy Land.... Christian holy sites will be empty monuments.
The Christian community should not assume that they need only be
concerned with their relations with the Israeli government. The Palestinian Ministry of Religion recently appointed Ibrahim Kandallaf, a
Greek Orthodox resident of East Jerusalem, to be Advisor on Christian
Affairs. While Kandallaf's authority, so to speak, extends only to areas
within the control of the Palestinian Authority, where there are presently
few Christian holy sites, he in fact operates de facto in Jerusalem, joining
Israeli officials on the dais at East Jerusalem Christian events.39 Moreover, the Christian Community cannot be certain that Kandallaf's authority will not be enlarged. Indeed, it is reported that the so-called AbuMazen-Beilin "non-paper" on final status issues, including Jerusalem,
called for the Church of the Holy Sepulcher to be placed under extraterritorial Palestinian jurisdiction.4 d And recently, while denied by the Palestinians, Israeli officials raised concerns over the fate of a Christian holy
site, Jesus' cradle, which is located on the Temple Mount, suggesting that
the Muslim authorities might be planning to tear down that Christian
site.4 ' Further, in July, the Palestinian Authority evicted a "White" Russian contingent from a Church in Hebron (which it controls under the
Oslo Agreement) and presented it to representatives of the Russian Patriarch in MOSCOW. 4 Thus, the Christian communities may have no
choice but to negotiate with the Palestinians.

lems for Israel, which historically has not distinguished between Palestinian Christians and
Muslims, some focus on this issue may be needed to preserve Christian life in the Holy
Land.
38. David Gibson, Holy Land's Christiansin Need of Miracle, THE RECORD (Bergen
County, NJ), Dec. 26, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 6124127.
39. See Bill Hutman, Olmert: PA Official Liaising with Churches, JERUSALEM POST,
Nov. 28,1996, at 2.
40. The Abu Mazen-Beilin non-paper was concluded and initialed in November 1996,
but was never accepted by either Yasser Arafat or then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres. See
Ze'ev Schiff, Beilin and Abu Mazen Drafted a Document on FinalStatus; Agreed to Establish a PalestinianState, HA'ARETZ, Feb. 22, 1996, at 1; see also David Makovsky, Time for
Beilin to Disclose Agreement in Full, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 25, 1996, at 2; The Past, Present and Future of the Oslo Process: View from the Labor Party, PEACEWATCH No. 112
(Wash. Inst. for Near East Pol'y, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 11, 1996, at 1 (summarizing a
speech of Yossi Beilin).
41. See Karin Laub, Foreign Minister Asks Police to Monitor Christian Holy Site,
Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 3, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 4452274.
42. See Serge Schmemann, Arafat Enters Into a New Fray, Over a Russian Church,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1997, at A3.
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It should have been no surprise then that shortly after signing the 1993
Vatican-Israel Accord the Vatican moved toward establishing official
links with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). In October
1994, following several months of negotiations, the Vatican and the PLO
announced the establishment of official links. The PLO opened an office
at the Vatican and the papal nuncio in Tunis became responsible for the
Vatican's contacts with PLO leaders. In a joint statement issued by the
Vatican, the parties announced that the official links would "open channels for communication" to "jointly... search for peace and justice... in
the Middle East" with a view toward "preserving the religious and cultural values which mark the Peoples of the region, and which properly
Jerusalem., 43
belong to the Holy Land and especially to the Holy City of
B. The Status of the Holy Places
Having recognized both the state of Israel and the PLO, the Vatican
now hopes to have a "seat" at the table when final status issues are discussed. 4 The Vatican has asserted its position in the Jerusalem question
as not only a matter of right but "a right which it exercises-to express a
moral judgment on the situation. 4 5 However described, this right does
not extend to such "technical aspects" as the territorial boundaries of the
city or its form of governance. 46 Rather, Vatican concerns center around
three objectives. First, the Vatican consistently has promoted the adoption of an "internationally guaranteed special statute" to resolve the issue of Jerusalem.47 The goals of such a statute would be to: (1) safeguard
the global character of Jerusalem as a sacred heritage common to the
three monotheistic religions; (2) preserve religious freedom in all aspects;
43. PLO Vatican Establish Links, but not Full Diplomatic Recognition, DEUTSCHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR, Oct. 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Allnews File.
44. The Vatican Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Archbishop Jean-Louis
Tauran, has pointed out that "[t]he religious aspect of Jerusalem must be discussed in a
multilateral forum, and we want to be involved in it." Vatican Official: Nobody Can Claim
Exclusive Rights to Holy Places, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 19,1995, at 1.

45. Vatican Note: Jerusalem: Considerations of the Secretariat of State, 26 ORIGINS
250, 250 (1996) [hereinafter Vatican Note]. Indeed, this right is contained in Article 11 of
the Fundamental Agreement between the Holy See and the State of Israel, which provides
that the Holy See maintains the right, in every case, to exercise its moral and spiritual
teaching office. See Fundamental Agreement, supra note 18, art. 11, para. 2, at 157.
46. See Vatican Note, supra note 45, at 253. The Holy See "is not concerned with the
question of how many square meters or kilometers constitute the disputed territory." Id.
at 251. Still, it is important to underscore its view that "a political solution will not be valid
unless it takes into account in a profound and just manner the religious needs present in
the city." Id. at 253.
47. See Angelo Macchi & Giovanni Rulli, The Future of Jerusalem, LA CIVILTA
CATrOLICA (Rome) June 15, 1996, reprintedin 26 ORIGINS 254, 256 (1996).
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(3) protect the "status quo"; (4) assure permanence and the development
of religious, educational, and social activities proper to each community;
(5) ensure equality of treatment to all three religions; and (6) establish an
appropriate juridical safeguard that does not reflect the will of only one
of the interested parties involved.48
As a matter of principle, the Vatican adheres to the view that the issues surrounding Jerusalem are of concern to more than the two parties
involved, and that there is a unique international interest in what happens to the Holy City. As one authoritative Vatican source has noted,
"[w]hen it comes to Jerusalem, the voice of others (besides Israelis and
Palestinians), the presence of additional subjects legitimized by international law, and the appropriate contribution of religious and cultural institutions ...cannot be considered purely superfluous, or worse, unsuitable." 49
Second, the Vatican cares about more than the "simple extraterritoriality" of the holy places. Its focus is on what we moderns might call the
environmental and cultural character of the Jerusalem it cares about
most-the Old City. It wants the surrounds of the holy places to reflect
their august majesty (no McDonalds perhaps) and it needs a living community of the faithful to breathe life into what would otherwise be holy
relics. More than anything, it is this demographic concern that keeps the
Vatican from limiting its concerns to the holy places themselves.
Finally, the Vatican believes that religious rights of freedom of religion
and conscience must be preserved and protected. Optimally, the Vatican
is insistent on an international statutory instrument to achieve this goal.
Yet to a nuanced observer, it appears that the specific modalities of "bilateral-plus" are open to discussion. We must remember that most of
this work has already been resolved in the Fundamental Agreement. ° In
this area at least, there is little untethered ground for a new international
agreement to cover. Some have suggested, however, that were Israel to
affirm existing international instruments (many of which it already has
committed itself to), the required bow to the notion of international
guarantees might well be met. Several of these instruments include the
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,51 the 1972
48. See GERUSALEMME NEI DOCUMENTI PONTIFICI A CURA DI EDMOND FARHAT,
CITrA DEL VATICANO, LIBRERIA EDITRICE 215-16 (Vatican City 1987).

49. Macchi & Rulli, supra note 47, at 254.
50. Freedom of religion and conscience are protected in Article 1, sections 1 and 2.
See Fundamental Agreement, supra note 18, art. 1, para. 1-2, at 154-55.
51. See Nov. 25, 1981, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N.
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UNESCO Convention on the Protection of World Cultural and Natural
Heritage,52 and, the 1976 Recommendation Concerning the Safeguarding
and Contemporary Role of Historic Areas.53
The exact modalities of such an arrangement to protect religious rights,
if any, will likely depend in large measure on the general state of the
Vatican-Israel relations at the time. To the extent that the Vatican's
concerns regarding Jerusalem and the holy places are accomplished
through the Fundamental Agreement, the Vatican's need to "internationalize" these issues likely will lessen.
C. The Jubilee Year
The Christian world is preparing for the 2000th anniversary of the
birth of Christ and the beginning of Christianity. Catholics have designated the millennium the Jubilee Year. Large numbers of Christians are
expected to visit the Holy Land.54 The Pope himself has been invited by
the Israeli government55 and there is some sense that if the peace process
advances he may well visit. The Jubilee Year provides an extralegal, and
indeed extrapolitical, rationale for the Vatican and Israel to resolve outstanding issues.
At the same time, we will likely soon move into a new phase of negotiation in the Palestinian-Israel Peace talks. Whether or not that phase is
styled final status negotiations or some form of "Oslo-plus," it is likely to
encompass issues surrounding Jerusalem, with which the Vatican has expressed clear and stated concerns. There can be little doubt that the experience of the Vatican-Israel Accord will serve the parties in good stead
as they move into this new phase of difficult negotiations.
IV. CONCLUSION: RELIGION AND THE STATE
Both the Vatican and the State of Israel present unique vantage points
from which to examine how religion and religious identity interact with
the state and, in particular, the democratic state. The Church, of course,
Doc. A/36/51 (1982).
52. See UNESCO Convention concerning the protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 6 UNESCO Doc. 17/C106 (1972), reprintedin 11 I.L.M.
1358 (1973).
53. The Convention and the Recommendation are reprinted in CONVENTIONS &
RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNESCO CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF THE CULTURAL

HERITAGE (Paris, UNESCO 1985).

54. See Larry Witham, Holy Land Visits Seen Ballooning Next 3 Years, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, at A5.
55. See Haim Shapiro, Katsav to Meet with Pope Today, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 15,
1998, at 4.
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historically viewed, and indeed still views itself as in possession of unalloyed universal truth. Historically, Catholic countries were never responsive to theories of toleration and religious pluralism. The 1492 expulsion adverred to in Rafael Palomino's essay on the Concordat in
Spain stands as mute testimony to this religious exclusivity.56 Only after
Vatican II have countries who view themselves as Catholic in national
identity had to wrestle seriously with issues of religious freedom and pluralism.
Issues of religious toleration and pluralism in Judaism were of theoretical interest only until the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.
While an effort was made by some religious parties to institutionalize
Jewish (religious) law in the new Jewish state,57 it did not succeed. The
Knesset, in 1980, did ordain that any lacunae in legal interpretation
should be answered by recourse to the principles of "Israel's Heritage," a
more elusive-and perhaps more flexible-reed than halacha or Jewish
law.58
While Israel today, with a fifteen percent Arab minority, is an explicitly democratic state; it is one which seeks, at least in the eyes of most
citizens, to maintain a specifically Jewish character. During the last Labor government the issue arose both in matters small-should the national anthem Hatikva speak exclusively of a homeland for Jews-and
large-should a majority of specifically Jewish voters be required to elect
a government that agrees to give up national territory.
The signing of the Vatican-Israel Accord opened a new chapter in both
the bilateral relations between Israel and the Holy See and the relations
between the Catholic Church and the Jewish people. It also offered a
unique opportunity to explore principles of religious freedom and toleration in a state that maintains a particular religious character. As such,
developments which flow from the Accord are of interest not only to
students of Israel and the Vatican, but also to comparativists in the theory of church and state in the modern age.

56. See Rafael Palomino, The Fundamental Agreement Between the Holy See and
the State of Israel: A Third Anniversary Perspective-Church-State Agreements in Spain,
47 CATH. U. L. REV. 477 (1998).
57. See EMANUEL RACKMAN, ISRAEL'S EMERGING CONSTITUTION 1948-1951, at
31-32, 45-49 (1954). The argument for institutionalizing religious law in the Israel legal
system is developed in K. KAHANA, THE CASE FOR JEWISH CIVIL LAW IN THE JEWISH

STATE 109-13 (1960).
58. See The Foundation of Law Act, 1980, 34 L.S.I. 5740, (1980). A criticism of the
effectiveness of the Act can be found in Ya'akov Meron, PracticalApplication of the
Foundationsof Law Act, in 8 THE JEWISH LAW ANNUAL 159 (1989).
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The essays in this issue offer unique insight into how domestic issues of
church and state can play out over a transnational and international context. Father David Jaeger, a scholar intimately involved in the negotiations leading up to the Accord, offers an exhaustive study of its legal context from a Vatican perspective. 9 The international implications of some
of these issues are well-developed by Moshe Hirsch in his study of the
right of conversion in international law, 6° and by Geoffrey Watson in his
paper on the international legal issues associated with the religious duty
of pilgrimage. 61 In contrast, Ruth Lapidoth discusses church-state relations in the domestic law of Israel, the country where the Accord must be
effectuated and where the promise of freedom of religious expression
must be fulfilled. 62
Because the Accord is only one of many bilateral Vatican agreements
which address the position of the Holy See and the Catholic Church as to
respective States, the decision was made to include the comparative
studies of Silvio Ferrari,63 Rafael Palomino, 64 and Msgr. Roland Minnerath on Concordats-those official agreements which govern the
Roman Catholic church in its relations with specific nation-states. While
the Accord is in specific terms not a Concordat, but rather an agreement
regulating a political relationship that has been integrated into a document of political recognition, the comparative study of Concordats provides useful background against which to better understand the Accord.
The unique contribution of this symposium is its treatment of a bilateral treaty on religious issues from domestic, comparative, and international law perspectives. It allows, I believe, for a deeper contextual understanding of the issues involved. One can hope that future studies of

59. See Fr. David-Maria A. Jaeger, The Fundamental Agreement Between the Holy
See and the State of Israel:A New Legal R6gime of Church-StateRelations, 47 CATH. U. L.
REV. 427 (1998).
60. See Moshe Hirsch, The Freedom of Proselytism Under the Fundamental Agreement and InternationalLaw, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 407 (1998).
61. See Geoffrey R. Watson, Progressfor Pilgrims? An Analysis of the Holy SeeIsrael FundamentalAgreement, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 497 (1998).
62. See Ruth Lapidoth, Freedom of Religion and of Conscience in Israel,47 CATH. U.
L. REV. 441 (1998).
63. See Silvio Ferrari, The Fundamental Agreement Between the Holy See and Israel
and the Conventions Between States and the Church Since the Vatican 11 Council, 47 CATH.
U. L. REV. 385 (1998).
64. See Palomino, supra note 56, at 477.
65. See Msgr. Prof. Roland Minnerath, The Position of the Catholic Church Regarding Concordatsfrom a Doctrinal and Pragmatic Perspective, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 467
(1998).
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religious liberty abroad take advantage of this approach which is far
more suited to the study of law and religion than purely doctoral analysis.
More specifically, one can hope that this symposium will encourage
further comparative study of Vatican concordats in their political and
cultural context, such as those in France and Poland; as well as the study
of religious liberty abroad in areas including Asia, Africa, China, and the
Muslim world. This said, the Vatican-Jerusalem Agreement remains sui
generis, as must any agreement that deals with religion in what so many
view as the Holy Land. Future agreements with the Greek Orthodox
and other Christian groups will surely come, as well as agreements, formal and informal, with both Palestinian and Muslim authorities regarding the Muslim holy sites. From now on, all such efforts will have to begin with and reflect on the experience of Israel and the Holy See in
drafting the Fundamental Agreement.

